63 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
63 lines
3.3 KiB
Markdown
# Runtime secrets
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The canonical deployment secret is the single local file
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`deploy/secrets/thothii.secrets`. Copy the tracked template and protect the copy:
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```sh
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cp deploy/secrets/thothii.secrets.example deploy/secrets/thothii.secrets
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chmod 600 deploy/secrets/thothii.secrets
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```
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The file uses strict `KEY=VALUE` lines (comments and blank lines are allowed). The supported
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keys are `THT_MODEL_API_KEY`, `THT_DWH_API_KEY`, `THT_CA`, and `THT_SSL_CA`. Values must be
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non-empty and contain no whitespace. Do not put secrets
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in the root `.env`, workspace YAML, URLs, logs, or rendered Compose output.
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Do not add vector or embedding endpoint credentials to the bundle. Active operator manuals use
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internal Qdrant and Ollama services, so vector/embedding runtime endpoint secrets are not part of
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the supported installation contract.
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Compose mounts the bundle read-only as `/run/secrets/thothii.secrets`. The host file must be a
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regular non-symlink file with mode `0600` or `0400`; Docker's normal `0444` mode is accepted
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only for the runtime mount beneath `/run/secrets`. The core runs as UID 10001. Verify the mount
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without printing its contents:
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```sh
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docker compose --env-file deploy/env/local.env \
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-f compose.yaml -f deploy/compose.local.yaml \
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run --rm core sh -c 'id && test -r /run/secrets/thothii.secrets'
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```
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A private CA PEM chain is not a bundle value: PEM whitespace is rejected by the strict parser.
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Keep it in the host or secret manager and add a reviewed Compose override that mounts it at
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`/run/secrets/ca-chain.pem` and sets `THT_SSL_CA` (or the adapter-specific setting). The base
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Compose files intentionally do not create this mount.
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## Migration from separate secret files
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Older installations used `THT_*_SECRET_FILE` variables and one file per value. Migrate by
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copying each retained value to its bundle key, validating with the complete base+profile command,
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and only then deleting the old files. The old variables remain a compatibility path for staged
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upgrades, but the documented and tested default is an absolute `THT_SECRETS_FILE` path to the
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protected bundle.
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Hosted Pi providers must use a single model key through `THT_MODEL_API_KEY`. Compound providers
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(Bedrock, Azure OpenAI Responses, Cloudflare Workers AI/Gateway) fail closed until a
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provider-specific credential adapter is implemented.
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## User-owned session database secrets
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The server-session overlay deliberately does **not** add session database credentials to the
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shared bundle. Materialize three distinct Docker secrets from protected host or secret-manager
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files: `session_runtime_password`, `session_migrator_password`, and `session_ca.pem`. Their host
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source paths are respectively `THT_SESSION_RUNTIME_PASSWORD_SOURCE`,
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`THT_SESSION_MIGRATOR_PASSWORD_SOURCE`, and `THT_SESSION_CA_SOURCE`; all must be absolute paths
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outside the repository. The runtime password is mounted only into `core`; the migrator password
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is mounted only into the one-shot `session-migrate` service. Do not reuse either login for the
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other role.
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`session_ca.pem` is a PEM file rather than a bundle value because the bundle rejects whitespace.
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The server workspace receives only its mount path through `THT_SESSION_DB_SSLROOTCERT`; it uses
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`THT_SESSION_DB_SSLMODE=verify-ca` or, normally, `verify-full`. TLS disable/prefer/require modes
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are unsupported for session storage.
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