chore: hygiene pass — ruff clean, docs storage-model truth, replay /me, failSession log

Audit findings 6.1-6.4 + the audit's remediation plan itself
(docs/superpowers/plans/2026-07-20-full-audit-remediation-plan.md).

- ruff: 34 → 0 (unused imports/f-strings auto-fixed; E702 semicolon lines
  split in test files; one unused local dropped). Suite still 819 green.
- CLAUDE.md + PROJECT_STATE.md no longer claim "no database / settings in
  settings.json": the harness selects filesystem OR PostgreSQL session
  storage (repository.py, server mode), and settings flow through harness
  preferences with the JSON file as fallback only.
- tools/replay: stub /me (SPA boot was parsing the SPA's own HTML as JSON)
  and /runtime/prewarm.
- failSession best-effort persistence now logs its failure server-side
  instead of vanishing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-07-20 01:55:41 +02:00
co-authored by Claude Fable 5
parent 1ab0015460
commit c4951e2aa5
21 changed files with 283 additions and 43 deletions
+10 -6
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@@ -52,11 +52,14 @@ frontend (React/SSE) → backend (Fastify) → pi --mode rpc → tht/harness →
There is no verbatim transcript store. A resumed Pi process rebuilds context from
`tht session show <id>` + the on-disk artifacts.
- **The backend is a thin bridge with no database.** `ThtRunner` shells `tht` subcommands;
`PiProcessManager` runs one Pi child per session and bridges its RPC stream;
- **The backend is a thin bridge with no database of its own.** `ThtRunner` shells `tht`
subcommands; `PiProcessManager` runs one Pi child per session and bridges its RPC stream;
`SessionBridge` maps Pi RPC events → client events (`ui_request`/`text_delta`/`info`);
`SseHub` fans them out over SSE to the browser. App settings live in a JSON file
(`backend/data/settings.json`), not a DB.
`SseHub` fans them out over SSE to the browser. Persistence belongs to the HARNESS, which
selects the session repository from the workspace config (`harness/tht/session/repository.py`):
filesystem by default, **PostgreSQL when `session_storage` is configured** (server/portable
deployment). Settings flow through harness preferences (`tht session preferences`) with
`backend/data/settings.json` only as the file fallback for injected runners/tests.
- **Human-in-the-loop gate contract.** The model proposes; a human reviewer decides at gates
via widgets (`reviewer_select` = single pick — a chosen option carrying a `decision` payload
@@ -75,8 +78,9 @@ frontend (React/SSE) → backend (Fastify) → pi --mode rpc → tht/harness →
- **Workspaces** (`harness/workspaces/*.yaml`) set the DB target and **absolute**
`paths.sessions/artifacts/indexes` — for `psd` these point at a *separate, uncommitted* repo
(`tht-workspace-psd/`). Secrets live ONLY in `harness/.env` (gitignored).
- **Settings are global** (`backend/data/settings.json`: workspace/provider/model/thinking);
the New-session form is question-only.
- **Settings are global** (workspace/provider/model/thinking, persisted via harness
preferences — `backend/data/settings.json` is only the fallback); the New-session form is
question-only.
- **Resume**: a resumable session re-enters at its last incomplete phase. The backend refuses
resume with 409 when `finalized` or `archived`, and `PiProcessManager.spawnFor` must send
`/riprendi-sessione <id>` (resume mode) vs `/nuova-domanda` (new) — sending the wrong prompt
+5 -2
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@@ -346,8 +346,11 @@ All three layers' deps installed (`npm install` in each, `python -m venv + pip i
repo `tht-workspace-psd/`, NOT committed here).
- Secrets live ONLY in `harness/.env` (gitignored; `THT_*` — DB, DWH REST, vector, SSL CA…).
See `harness/.env.example` for the variable list.
- App settings (global): `backend/data/settings.json` (gitignored) — `{ workspace, provider,
model, thinking }`. The "New session" form is question-only; these settings supply the rest.
- App settings (global): `{ workspace, provider, model, thinking }`, persisted via harness
preferences (`tht session preferences get/set` → the configured session repository —
filesystem or Postgres in server mode). `backend/data/settings.json` (gitignored) remains
only the file fallback for injected runners/tests. The "New session" form is question-only;
these settings supply the rest.
## Efficiency levers (NL→SQL workflow optimization, 2026-07-08)
+5 -1
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@@ -98,7 +98,11 @@ export function sessionRoutes(
// old failure must not touch its manifest.
const bound = boundRuntimes.get(id);
if (bound !== undefined && bound !== rt) return;
await runner.failSession(id, workspace).catch(() => undefined);
// Best-effort by design (crash path), but a storage outage must be
// visible server-side: the manifest stays open and resume remains legal.
await runner.failSession(id, workspace).catch((error: unknown) => {
console.error(`[session:${id}] failSession persistence failed:`, error);
});
}).catch(() => undefined);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
# Full-codebase audit — remediation plan (2026-07-20)
Source: adversarial review (3 Codex reviewers — Skeptic/Architect/Minimalist — per the
adversarial-review skill) + independent verification of every finding + objective checks.
Baseline at commit `803b98d`: harness 812 pytest pass (l0/l2 deselected), backend 228,
frontend 309, both `tsc` clean, **ruff 34 errors** (all in `harness/tests`).
Verdict: **REJECT** (per skill verdict logic: high-severity findings with multi-reviewer
consensus). The app is functional and green on tests, but ships 5 confirmed high-severity
defects. Nothing here is data-destroying in the happy path; the highs are silent-wrong-state
and workflow-integrity classes.
Every finding below was re-verified in the current code by the lead (line numbers checked).
Two reviewer findings were **rejected** in lead judgment and are listed at the bottom.
---
## FASE 1 — Pi-crash class closure (gate) — ~1h, no behavior change
**1.1 [HIGH] Five gate tools can still crash Pi on an uncaught throw.**
`harness/.pi/extensions/tht-gate.js` — `reviewer_memory_promote` (execute at ~1343),
`rewrite_question` (~1431), `write_schema_linking` (~1484), `write_cte_sql` (~1511),
`write_final_sql` (~1527). Same class as the crash fixed in `87cb806` for the four
`reviewer_*` tools: `currentPhase()`/`phaseId()`/`tht()` run outside any try/catch; a
throw rejects the async execute → Node unhandled rejection → Pi dies mid-session.
FIX: wrap each execute body in the same top-level try/catch → `textResult` pattern.
VERIFY: `node -c`; grep-test asserting every `registerTool` execute has a top-level try.
## FASE 2 — Workflow integrity (single-source the phase truth) — ~half day
**2.1 [HIGH] WorkflowBar phase labels are fiction from F2 onward.**
`frontend/src/shell/WorkflowBar.tsx:5-29` hardcodes
`F2 "Schema linking" / F3 "Exploration" / F4 "SQL plan" / F5 "SQL generation" / F6
"Validation" / F7 "Review"`, while `harness/workflow.yaml` defines
`F2 memoria / F3 riscrittura / F4 schema_linking / F5 sintesi / F6 cte / F7 sql_finale`.
Every live session shows the wrong phase name to the reviewer from F2 on.
FIX (minimal): correct the two static maps to the canonical sequence.
FIX (right): backend `GET /workflow/meta` shelling `tht phase meta --json`, frontend
fetches once per app load with the corrected static map as fallback.
VERIFY: unit test mapping `tht phase meta --json` ids/names ↔ rendered labels.
**2.2 [HIGH] Gate `forceAdvance` contradicts the canonical SKILL.md.**
`harness/.pi/skills/tht-sessione/SKILL.md:30-32`: "`advance:true` auto-advances only F2
(empty memory) and F6 (skipped/empty) — never a phase that recorded substantive
decisions." But since `6ee5bda`, `reviewer_decide` and `reviewer_schema_linking` with
`advance:true` **force-advance any phase** after persisting decisions
(`tht-gate.js` `forceAdvance`, used at ~895 and ~1002). The model reads one contract and
the gate implements another → nondeterministic workflow shape (phases may skip their
`reviewer_confirm kind:"phase"` summary gate depending on what the model passes).
The force-advance behavior was a deliberate product choice (kill the redundant approve
form); the defect is the contradiction, not the feature.
FIX: (a) restrict `forceAdvance` to the two designed auto-close gates
(`reviewer_schema_linking` in F4, `reviewer_memory_promote` in F8 via
`closeAfterPromotion`); `reviewer_decide` returns to `advanceIfReady` (exit-6 no-op);
(b) rewrite SKILL.md §"Phase map (advance cheat-sheet)" to document exactly which gates
auto-advance; (c) add the allowlist as data in `workflow.yaml` (e.g. `advance:
gate_closes`) so gate and skill read one source.
VERIFY: L1 test on the allowlist; live smoke on psd (F4 auto-advances, F5 does not).
## FASE 3 — Transport correctness (SSE) — ~half day
**3.1 [HIGH, 3/3 reviewer consensus] Stale `Last-Event-ID` from an older backend
generation is honored when ids collide.**
`backend/src/sse/sse-hub.ts:55-63`: the stale-cursor guard only catches
`cursor > lastId`. After a backend restart, ids restart at 1; a browser auto-reconnect
carrying cursor N from the old process silently suppresses the new generation's events
1..N (different content, same ids). Contract 11 in `brain/codebase/workflow-ui-contracts.md`
is only half-implemented.
FIX: make the event id a composite `"<generation>:<seq>"` (generation = process-start
epoch, e.g. `Date.now()` at Hub construction). `Last-Event-ID` is opaque to EventSource,
so no frontend change: on subscribe, parse the cursor; generation mismatch → treat as 0.
VERIFY: regression test — two Hub instances, cursor from A replayed against B must
replay from the beginning.
**3.2 [MEDIUM] Transport state never evicted for finished sessions.**
`sse-hub.ts:41-44` — `buffers`/`lastIds` grow per session; `forget()` is called only by
the delete route. Long-lived deployments accumulate state for every session ever touched.
FIX: call `hub.forget(id)` when a session reaches a terminal state (finalized+agent_end,
archived) — the transcript UI reads persisted documents, not the SSE buffer.
VERIFY: unit test — finalize → maps empty for that id.
## FASE 4 — Process & route robustness (backend) — ~half day
**4.1 [MEDIUM] `spawnFor` leaks a live child + registered runtime when `configure()`
rejects.** `backend/src/pi/pi-process-manager.ts:177-182`: `createFor` registers the
runtime; if `configure` (set_model/set_thinking RPC) rejects, `spawnFor` throws without
teardown → the map keeps an apparently-active runtime with a live Pi child; every later
start gets "session runtime already active".
FIX: try/catch in `spawnFor` → identity-checked teardown + rethrow.
VERIFY: unit test with a configure that rejects.
**4.2 [MEDIUM] No timeout on any `tht` call except `dbPing`.**
`backend/src/tht/tht-runner.ts:67-101`: `run()` supports `timeoutMs` but only `dbPing`
passes one. A DWH/vector op that hangs (VPN drop mid-call: `sql preview`, `search pack`,
`ollama ensure`) wedges the HTTP request forever.
FIX: default timeout in `run()` (60s) + explicit per-call values (dbPing 10s,
sqlPreview/searchPack 120s). On timeout the existing code-124 path already SIGKILLs.
VERIFY: unit test with a sleeping fake bin.
**4.3 [MEDIUM] Missing workspace YAML silently falls back to the default config.**
`tht-runner.ts:51-56`: `configArg("typo")` returns the default `-c` when
`workspaces/typo.yaml` doesn't exist → sessions/operations silently target the wrong
workspace (wrong DB, wrong sessions dir).
FIX: throw on a named-but-missing workspace; let routes surface 500 with the message.
VERIFY: unit test.
**4.4 [MEDIUM] Resume returns `200 alreadyActive` before the finalized/archived 409.**
`backend/src/routes/sessions.ts:288-296`: the runtime fast-path short-circuits the
read-only contract. A finalized session with a lingering running runtime resumes as if
live.
FIX: evaluate the manifest 409 first; only then the alreadyActive fast-path.
VERIFY: existing route test extended (finalized manifest + fake active runtime → 409).
**4.5 [LOW] `ollamaEnsure` treats exit-0 with unparseable stdout as ok.**
`tht-runner.ts:204-206`. FIX: on code 0 require parsed JSON (else ok:false with detail).
**4.6 [LOW] `respond()` sends stale gate responses with the wrong Pi RPC id.**
`backend/src/bridge/session-bridge.ts:110-117`: a retried response for gate A while B is
pending goes out with B's `pendingPiId`; Pi's descriptor-id check re-loops it (transient,
self-healing). FIX: drop the response unless `pending && uiResponse.id === pending.id`.
## FASE 5 — State integrity (harness + gate persistence) — ~1 day
**5.1 [MEDIUM] `phase reopen` deletes artifacts before recording `phase_reopened`.**
`harness/tht/cli/phase_cmd.py:124-128`: crash between `teardown_snapshot()` and
`append_decisions()` → artifacts of later phases deleted but ledger still at the old
phase; resume enters a phase whose expected artifacts are gone.
FIX: append `phase_reopened` FIRST, then teardown, and make teardown idempotent +
re-runnable: on session load, if the folded phase is behind surviving later-phase
artifacts, re-run the teardown repair pass. (Ledger-first means the half-state is
"reopened with stale extra artifacts", which the repair pass cleans deterministically.)
VERIFY: unit test simulating the crash window (teardown raises after ledger append).
**5.2 [MEDIUM] Schema-linking approval persists N decisions non-atomically.**
`tht-gate.js` ~967-1000: one `tht decision add` per table/column; a transient failure
mid-loop returns an error with the ledger half-written; a retry re-adds the first K
decisions (duplicate entries; projection is set-based so the artifact survives, but the
audit ledger lies).
FIX: batch the whole review into one CLI call (`tht decision add-batch --doc -` on the
model of the existing `add-join-set`), atomic single append.
VERIFY: L1 test; retry after injected failure produces no duplicates.
**5.3 [HIGH] Anti-bypass hook does not cover bash writes to protected state.**
`tht-gate.js:141-158` + hook 550-585: `FORBIDDEN` blocks specific `tht` subcommands and
`GATE_CODE_FILES` blocks the `write`/`edit` TOOLS, but plain bash can still mutate
protected state: `echo '{"type":"phase_approved"...}' >> review_decisions.jsonl`,
`sed -i` on `session_manifest.yaml`, `cat > .pi/extensions/tht-gate.js`.
This is defense against a *confused* model (it has already edited its own gate once —
see memory), not a hostile one; perfect sandboxing is out of scope.
FIX: extend the bash branch of the tool_call hook with a protected-path pattern: block
any bash command whose text references `review_decisions.jsonl`, `session_manifest.yaml`,
`cte_plan.json` or `.pi/extensions/` in a mutating context (`>`, `>>`, `tee`, `sed -i`,
`mv`, `cp`, `rm`, `python … open(...,'w')`). Read-only mentions (cat/grep) stay allowed.
VERIFY: L1 tests on the pattern (block list + allow list).
## FASE 6 — Docs & hygiene — ~1h
**6.1 [MEDIUM] CLAUDE.md/PROJECT_STATE describe a storage model that no longer exists.**
CLAUDE.md says "backend … no database", "App settings live in a JSON file
(`backend/data/settings.json`)". Since the portable-deployment merge the truth is:
`harness/tht/session/repository.py:69-86` selects **PostgresSessionRepository** when
`session_storage` is configured (server mode) vs filesystem; backend settings go through
harness preferences (`backend/src/app.ts:61-80`), with the JSON file as fallback only.
FIX: update CLAUDE.md architecture bullets + PROJECT_STATE.md; add one line on when each
repository/settings path is active.
**6.2 [LOW] ruff: 34 errors in `harness/tests` (19 E702, 13 F401, 1 F841, 1 F541).**
FIX: `ruff check . --fix` (14 auto), hand-fix the E702 semicolons. Add ruff to whatever
gate runs before commits (it exists in dev deps; it just isn't enforced).
**6.3 [LOW] Replay server drifts from the real REST surface.**
`tools/replay/server.mjs`: `/me` is missing (SPA calls it on boot; replay serves the SPA
HTML → JSON parse noise); resume-shape drift was just fixed (`803b98d`) — audit the
remaining routes against `backend/src/routes/*.ts` and stub what the SPA actually calls.
VERIFY: replay boot with devtools console clean.
**6.4 [LOW] `failSession` failures are silently discarded (deliberate).**
`backend/src/routes/sessions.ts:111`: keep the swallow (crash-path best effort) but add a
`console.error` so a storage outage is at least visible server-side.
---
## Rejected reviewer findings (lead judgment)
- *Minimalist:* "`harness/README.md` references `docs/testing.md` which is absent" —
**rejected**: the file exists (`harness/docs/testing.md`).
- *Minimalist:* "bridge `respond()` lets a stale response wedge gate B" — **downgraded**
to 4.6: Pi's own descriptor-id check re-loops the gate; the flaw is real but transient.
- *Skeptic:* "failSession swallow leaves contradictory state" [medium] — **downgraded**
to 6.4: the catch is deliberate crash-path tolerance; only observability is missing.
## What went well (3/3 reviewers found no issues here)
- Pi runtime identity checks, duplicate-start protection, per-session lifecycle
single-flight in the routes.
- `-c` per-subcommand placement and `--json` purity (checked end to end).
- Tool-event sanitization across the backend/client boundary (contract 5).
- Phase folding / ledger mutation core logic and its test coverage.
## Suggested execution order
Fase 1 (crash class, 1h) → 2.1+2.2 (workflow integrity) → 3.1 (SSE generation) →
4.1-4.4 → 5.1-5.3 → 3.2 + Fase 6. Fasi 1-4 are independent of each other and safe to
land as separate commits; 5.1 and 5.2 touch the ledger contract and deserve their own
review pass.
## Environment note
The machine's `codex` CLI was broken (configured default model requires a newer CLI);
upgraded via Homebrew 0.137.0 → 0.144.6 to run the reviewers.
+1 -1
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@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ is not assumed reliable' gains real teeth for the data layer.
import pytest
from sqlalchemy import create_engine, text
from tht.db.connection import can_create_in_schema, make_engine, ping, writable_tables
from tht.db.connection import can_create_in_schema, ping, writable_tables
pytestmark = [pytest.mark.l0]
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ Run: pytest -m l2 tests/l2/test_memory_save_one_real.py -s (needs .env + VPN +
"""
from datetime import datetime
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import MagicMock
import pytest
+1 -1
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@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ def test_ablazione_session_manual(l2_env, tmp_path):
["THT_DWH_API_KEY", "THT_VEC_API_KEY", "THT_VEC_WRITE_API_KEY"])
assert env_ok
assert WORKSPACE.exists()
print(f"\n[L2 manual] launch: pi --mode rpc (cwd=harness/)")
print("\n[L2 manual] launch: pi --mode rpc (cwd=harness/)")
print(f"[L2 manual] /nuova-domanda \"{QUESTION}\"")
print("[L2 manual] confirm: sql_final.sql present + ledger has value_grounded/"
"concept_formula_approved. Session dir:", tmp_path)
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ def test_ablazione_returns_multiple_columns(l2_env):
non-collapsing aggregation. Requires a built LSH index (tht lsh build)."""
if not WORKSPACE.exists():
pytest.skip(f"per-customer workspace repo not found: {WORKSPACE} (clone tht-workspace-psd)")
from tht.config import LshConfig
try:
from tht.lshindex import load_index, query_index # ported with the lsh build path
except ModuleNotFoundError:
-1
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@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ Pure logic, no DB.
import json
from datetime import date, datetime
from decimal import Decimal
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
+1 -1
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@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ def test_decision_retracted_in_audit_but_marked(tmp_path):
d1 = append_decision(
session, type="table_promoted", subject="phase:4", detail="t1", rationale="r"
)
d2 = append_decision(
append_decision(
session,
type="decision_retracted",
subject="phase:4",
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ These tests pin: LIMIT added when absent, respected when present, never added to
non-query statements, and the truncation-detection contract (limit+1 rows).
Pure logic, no DB.
"""
import pytest
import sqlglot
from tht.execute import _inject_limit
-2
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@@ -6,9 +6,7 @@ surfaces a candidate formula, the reviewer approves or rejects it (recorded via
concept_formula_approved / concept_formula_rejected), and approved formulas are
part of the schema-linking artifact. The store is frontmatter-YAML + SQL body.
"""
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
from tht.evidence.formula_store import ConceptFormula, retrieve_formula, save_formula
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ enforced by the skill prose + gate, validated at L2; this test pins the RECORDIN
contract the gate relies on: free text from "Altro" must round-trip into the
decision rationale and survive persistence, never silently discarded.
"""
from pathlib import Path
from tht.decisions import append_decision, list_decisions
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ from datetime import datetime
from tht.config import EligibilityConfig
from tht.mschema.eligibility import classify_all, classify_column, effective_eligibility
from tht.mschema.models import (
Annotations,
ColumnAnnotation,
ColumnPhysical,
PhysicalSchema,
+14 -7
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@@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ def test_effective_decisions_excludes_stale_high_phase(tmp_path):
Sequenza: approva 1, approva 2, reopen a 1, poi table_promoted:4.
current_phase diventa 1 (il reopen). La table_promoted:4 e' di fase 4 > 1 -> stale.
"""
s = tmp_path / "s"; s.mkdir()
s = tmp_path / "s"
s.mkdir()
_d(s, "phase_approved", "phase:1")
_d(s, "phase_approved", "phase:2")
_d(s, "phase_reopened", "phase:1")
@@ -30,7 +31,8 @@ def test_effective_decisions_excludes_stale_high_phase(tmp_path):
def test_current_phase_after_reopen(tmp_path):
"""Il fold su audit-excluding-retracted gestisce correttamente il reopen e le ri-approvazioni."""
s = tmp_path / "s"; s.mkdir()
s = tmp_path / "s"
s.mkdir()
_d(s, "phase_approved", "phase:1")
_d(s, "phase_approved", "phase:2")
assert current_phase(s) == 3 # dopo 2 approvazioni -> fase 3
@@ -42,7 +44,8 @@ def test_current_phase_after_reopen(tmp_path):
def test_retracted_decision_excluded_from_effective(tmp_path):
"""Una decisione ritirata (decision_retracted) e' esclusa dalla vista effective."""
s = tmp_path / "s"; s.mkdir()
s = tmp_path / "s"
s.mkdir()
d1 = _d(s, "table_promoted", "phase:4", detail="t1")
_d(s, "decision_retracted", "phase:4", retracts=d1.seq)
# senza approvazioni di fase, current_phase=1; table_promoted:4 e' gia' > 1.
@@ -60,13 +63,15 @@ def test_retracted_decision_excluded_from_effective(tmp_path):
def test_current_phase_starts_at_1(tmp_path):
s = tmp_path / "s"; s.mkdir()
s = tmp_path / "s"
s.mkdir()
assert current_phase(s) == 1
def test_current_phase_clamps_at_max_plus_1(tmp_path):
"""Dopo tutte le approvazioni, current_phase = max_phase + 1."""
s = tmp_path / "s"; s.mkdir()
s = tmp_path / "s"
s.mkdir()
for n in range(1, 9):
_d(s, "phase_approved", f"phase:{n}")
assert current_phase(s) == 9 # max_phase(8) + 1
@@ -74,7 +79,8 @@ def test_current_phase_clamps_at_max_plus_1(tmp_path):
def test_effective_keeps_low_phase_after_high_phase_rollback(tmp_path):
"""Rollback a F4 NON invalida le decisioni delle fasi 1-3 (che restano <= current_phase)."""
s = tmp_path / "s"; s.mkdir()
s = tmp_path / "s"
s.mkdir()
_d(s, "concept_clarified", "phase:1", detail="x")
_d(s, "question_rewritten", "phase:3", detail="q")
_d(s, "table_promoted", "phase:4", detail="t")
@@ -97,7 +103,8 @@ def test_effective_keeps_low_phase_after_high_phase_rollback(tmp_path):
def test_effective_decisions_no_reopen_returns_all_non_retracted(tmp_path):
"""Senza reopen e senza retract, effective = tutte le decisioni (della fase corrente)."""
s = tmp_path / "s"; s.mkdir()
s = tmp_path / "s"
s.mkdir()
_d(s, "concept_clarified", "phase:1", detail="x")
_d(s, "phase_approved", "phase:1")
assert current_phase(s) == 2
-1
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@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ Pure-logic tests (no DB needed):
"""
import json
import pytest
from tht.execute.limit import inject_limit_offset
+1 -1
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@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ from tht.mschema.models import (
PhysicalSchema,
TablePhysical,
)
from tht.sqlcheck import CheckResult, validate_sql
from tht.sqlcheck import validate_sql
def _schema() -> PhysicalSchema:
+12 -7
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
from pathlib import Path
from tht.taskdoc import generate_task_doc
def test_task_doc_includes_question_and_schema_scope(tmp_path):
s = tmp_path / "sess"; s.mkdir()
s = tmp_path / "sess"
s.mkdir()
(s / "question.md").write_text("# Domanda\nQuanti pazienti?\n## Assunzioni\n- a")
(s / "schema_linking.json").write_text(
'{"question":"q","candidates":[{"kind":"table","name":"pazienti"}],"joins":[],"excluded":[],"open_questions":[]}'
@@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ def test_task_doc_includes_question_and_schema_scope(tmp_path):
def test_task_doc_never_embeds_full_physical_yaml(tmp_path):
"""physical.yaml e' fatale per un 35B/<200k (~190k token). Mai incorporarlo."""
s = tmp_path / "sess"; s.mkdir()
s = tmp_path / "sess"
s.mkdir()
(s / "question.md").write_text("q")
# un physical.yaml enorme fuori dalla sessione (come in ChironeWp3: artifacts/mschema/)
(s.parent / "physical.yaml").write_text("x: " + "y" * 800_000)
@@ -27,7 +28,8 @@ def test_task_doc_never_embeds_full_physical_yaml(tmp_path):
def test_task_doc_byte_budget_enforced_on_normal_input(tmp_path):
s = tmp_path / "sess"; s.mkdir()
s = tmp_path / "sess"
s.mkdir()
(s / "question.md").write_text("q")
doc = generate_task_doc(session_dir=s, phase=1)
assert doc.byte_budget_ok is True
@@ -35,7 +37,8 @@ def test_task_doc_byte_budget_enforced_on_normal_input(tmp_path):
def test_task_doc_byte_budget_violation_flagged(tmp_path):
"""Se un artefatto di sessione e' enorme (input perverso), byte_budget_ok diventa False."""
s = tmp_path / "sess"; s.mkdir()
s = tmp_path / "sess"
s.mkdir()
(s / "question.md").write_text("q")
(s / "schema_linking.json").write_text("x: " + "y" * 400_000) # ~400KB -> over budget
doc = generate_task_doc(session_dir=s, phase=7)
@@ -43,7 +46,8 @@ def test_task_doc_byte_budget_violation_flagged(tmp_path):
def test_task_doc_carries_phase_header(tmp_path):
s = tmp_path / "sess"; s.mkdir()
s = tmp_path / "sess"
s.mkdir()
(s / "question.md").write_text("q")
doc = generate_task_doc(session_dir=s, phase=4)
assert "fase 4" in doc.body.lower() or "fase 4" in doc.body
@@ -54,7 +58,8 @@ def test_task_doc_excludes_stale_decisions_post_rollback(tmp_path):
Dopo rollback a F4, una sql_approved:7 stale non appare nel brief delle decisioni."""
from tht.decisions import append_decision
from tht.phase import current_phase
s = tmp_path / "sess"; s.mkdir()
s = tmp_path / "sess"
s.mkdir()
(s / "question.md").write_text("q")
# simula: lavoro fino a F7, poi rollback a F4
append_decision(s, type="phase_approved", subject="phase:1")
+12 -6
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@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@ from tht.teardown import teardown_to_phase
def test_teardown_to_phase_4_deletes_phase5plus_artifacts(tmp_path):
s = tmp_path / "sess"; s.mkdir()
s = tmp_path / "sess"
s.mkdir()
(s / "schema_linking.json").write_text("{}") # F4 artifact
(s / "cte_plan.json").write_text("[]") # F6 artifact
(s / "ctes").mkdir()
@@ -19,7 +20,8 @@ def test_teardown_to_phase_4_deletes_phase5plus_artifacts(tmp_path):
def test_teardown_to_phase_1_deletes_everything(tmp_path):
"""Rollback a F1 cancella tutti gli artefatti (tutte le fasi > 1)."""
s = tmp_path / "sess"; s.mkdir()
s = tmp_path / "sess"
s.mkdir()
(s / "question.md").write_text("q") # F3 artifact
(s / "schema_linking.json").write_text("{}") # F4 artifact
(s / "cte_plan.json").write_text("[]") # F6 artifact
@@ -37,7 +39,8 @@ def test_teardown_to_phase_1_deletes_everything(tmp_path):
def test_teardown_to_phase_7_preserves_phase6_artifacts(tmp_path):
"""Rollback a F7 preserva gli artefatti delle fasi <= 7."""
s = tmp_path / "sess"; s.mkdir()
s = tmp_path / "sess"
s.mkdir()
(s / "schema_linking.json").write_text("{}") # F4 artifact
(s / "cte_plan.json").write_text("[]") # F6 artifact
(s / "ctes").mkdir()
@@ -52,14 +55,16 @@ def test_teardown_to_phase_7_preserves_phase6_artifacts(tmp_path):
def test_teardown_to_phase_on_empty_session_is_noop(tmp_path):
s = tmp_path / "sess"; s.mkdir()
s = tmp_path / "sess"
s.mkdir()
report = teardown_to_phase(s, target_phase=4)
assert report.deleted_files == []
def test_teardown_to_phase_nonexistent_artifacts_no_error(tmp_path):
"""Se gli artefatti non esistono (sessione nuova), teardown non fallisce."""
s = tmp_path / "sess"; s.mkdir()
s = tmp_path / "sess"
s.mkdir()
report = teardown_to_phase(s, target_phase=1)
assert report.deleted_files == []
@@ -67,7 +72,8 @@ def test_teardown_to_phase_nonexistent_artifacts_no_error(tmp_path):
def test_teardown_deletes_orphaned_cte_files_not_in_current_plan(tmp_path):
"""Il bug degli orfani CTE: dopo un re-derive con piano diverso, i vecchi .sql
non piu' nel piano restano su disco e bloccano finalize. teardown li pulisce."""
s = tmp_path / "sess"; s.mkdir()
s = tmp_path / "sess"
s.mkdir()
(s / "ctes").mkdir()
(s / "ctes" / "old_cte.sql").write_text("SELECT 1") # orphan
(s / "ctes" / "another.sql").write_text("SELECT 2") # orphan
-1
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@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
from pathlib import Path
from tht.workspace import load_workspace, WorkspaceError
+11
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@@ -334,6 +334,17 @@ const server = createServer(async (req, res) => {
}
// --- REST stubs the SPA needs to boot -----------------------------------
// The SPA queries /me at boot (principal for session scoping/admin UI). Falling
// through to the static handler served HTML that apiFetch tried to parse as JSON.
if (method === "GET" && path === "/me") {
return sendJson(res, 200, {
issuer: "replay", subject: "reviewer@replay", displayName: "Replay reviewer", isAdmin: true,
});
}
// Boot-time best-effort warmup: a no-op in replay (no Pi runtime exists).
if (method === "POST" && path === "/runtime/prewarm") {
return sendNoContent(res);
}
if (method === "GET" && path === "/health") {
return sendJson(res, 200, { ok: true, replay: true, gates: GATES.length });
}