Files
ThothII/harness/tht/evidence/adapters/http.py
T

288 lines
12 KiB
Python

"""Evidence-owned explicit-manifest HTTP source with SSRF-safe bounded acquisition."""
import hashlib
import ipaddress
import socket
from collections import OrderedDict
from datetime import UTC, datetime
from email.utils import parsedate_to_datetime
from urllib.parse import urljoin, urlsplit
import requests
from tht.evidence.contracts import (
AcquiredDocument,
EvidenceSourceError,
EvidenceSourceErrorCategory,
SourceObject,
canonical_provenance_uri,
)
class HttpManifestEvidenceSource:
def __init__(
self,
urls: list[str] | tuple[str, ...],
*,
connect_timeout: float = 5,
read_timeout: float = 30,
max_bytes: int = 10 * 1024 * 1024,
max_redirects: int = 5,
allow_private_hosts: bool = False,
max_cache_bytes: int = 64 * 1024 * 1024,
) -> None:
if not urls:
raise ValueError("HTTP evidence manifest must contain at least one URL")
if (
connect_timeout <= 0
or read_timeout <= 0
or max_bytes < 1
or max_redirects < 0
or max_cache_bytes < 1
):
raise ValueError("HTTP evidence limits must be positive")
self._transport_by_uri: dict[str, str] = {}
for url in urls:
self._validate_url_shape(url)
provenance = canonical_provenance_uri(url)
if provenance in self._transport_by_uri:
raise ValueError("HTTP evidence manifest contains duplicate canonical provenance")
self._transport_by_uri[provenance] = url
self.connect_timeout = connect_timeout
self.read_timeout = read_timeout
self.max_bytes = max_bytes
self.max_redirects = max_redirects
self.allow_private_hosts = allow_private_hosts
self.max_cache_bytes = max_cache_bytes
self._session = requests.Session()
self._session.trust_env = False
self._cache: OrderedDict[str, AcquiredDocument] = OrderedDict()
# provenance -> (exact final effective URL, ETag, Last-Modified)
self._validators: dict[str, tuple[str, str | None, str | None]] = {}
self._cache_bytes = 0
def __repr__(self) -> str:
return f"HttpManifestEvidenceSource(objects={len(self._transport_by_uri)})"
@staticmethod
def _safe_error(operation: str, *, transient: bool = False, **details):
return EvidenceSourceError(
"HTTP source operation failed",
category=(
EvidenceSourceErrorCategory.TRANSIENT
if transient
else EvidenceSourceErrorCategory.PERMANENT
),
details={"operation": operation, **details},
)
@staticmethod
def _validate_url_shape(url: str) -> None:
parsed = urlsplit(url)
if parsed.scheme not in {"http", "https"} or not parsed.hostname:
raise ValueError("HTTP evidence URLs must use http or https")
if parsed.username is not None or parsed.password is not None:
raise ValueError("HTTP evidence URLs must not contain userinfo credentials")
@staticmethod
def _source_id(uri: str) -> str:
return f"http:{hashlib.sha256(uri.encode()).hexdigest()}"
@staticmethod
def _normalized_ip(value: str) -> ipaddress.IPv4Address | ipaddress.IPv6Address:
address = ipaddress.ip_address(value.split("%", 1)[0])
if isinstance(address, ipaddress.IPv6Address) and address.ipv4_mapped:
return address.ipv4_mapped
return address
def _resolve_allowed(self, url: str) -> set[ipaddress.IPv4Address | ipaddress.IPv6Address]:
try:
self._validate_url_shape(url)
except ValueError as error:
raise self._safe_error("url_validation") from error
if self.allow_private_hosts:
return set()
parsed = urlsplit(url)
port = parsed.port or (443 if parsed.scheme == "https" else 80)
try:
rows = socket.getaddrinfo(parsed.hostname, port, type=socket.SOCK_STREAM)
addresses = {self._normalized_ip(row[4][0]) for row in rows}
except (OSError, ValueError) as error:
raise self._safe_error("resolution", transient=True) from error
if not addresses:
raise self._safe_error("resolution", transient=True)
# Reject the entire answer set if any address is private/reserved. Choosing only a public
# member would leave DNS ordering as a policy bypass.
if any(not address.is_global for address in addresses):
raise self._safe_error("network_policy")
return addresses
def _verify_peer(
self,
response,
allowed: set[ipaddress.IPv4Address | ipaddress.IPv6Address],
) -> None:
if self.allow_private_hosts:
return
try:
connection = response.raw._connection
peer = self._normalized_ip(connection.sock.getpeername()[0])
except (AttributeError, OSError, TypeError, ValueError) as error:
raise self._safe_error("peer_validation", transient=True) from error
if not peer.is_global or peer not in allowed:
raise self._safe_error("network_policy")
@staticmethod
def _status_category(status: int) -> EvidenceSourceErrorCategory:
if status in {408, 425, 429} or 500 <= status <= 599:
return EvidenceSourceErrorCategory.TRANSIENT
return EvidenceSourceErrorCategory.PERMANENT
def _conditional_headers(self, provenance: str, request_url: str) -> dict[str, str]:
cached = self._cache.get(self._source_id(provenance))
validators = self._validators.get(provenance)
if cached is None or validators is None:
return {}
final_url, etag, last_modified = validators
if request_url != final_url:
return {}
headers = {}
if etag:
headers["If-None-Match"] = etag
if last_modified:
headers["If-Modified-Since"] = last_modified
return headers
def _remember(
self,
provenance: str,
final_url: str,
document: AcquiredDocument,
validators: tuple[str | None, str | None],
) -> None:
source_id = document.source.source_id
old = self._cache.pop(source_id, None)
if old is not None:
self._cache_bytes -= len(old.content)
self._cache[source_id] = document
self._cache_bytes += len(document.content)
self._validators[provenance] = (final_url, *validators)
while self._cache and self._cache_bytes > self.max_cache_bytes:
evicted_id, evicted = self._cache.popitem(last=False)
self._cache_bytes -= len(evicted.content)
for uri in tuple(self._validators):
if self._source_id(uri) == evicted_id:
del self._validators[uri]
def _download(self, transport_url: str, provenance: str) -> AcquiredDocument:
current = transport_url
try:
for redirect_count in range(self.max_redirects + 1):
headers = self._conditional_headers(provenance, current)
allowed = self._resolve_allowed(current)
response = None
try:
response = self._session.get(
current,
headers=headers,
stream=True,
allow_redirects=False,
timeout=(self.connect_timeout, self.read_timeout),
)
self._verify_peer(response, allowed)
if response.is_redirect:
if redirect_count == self.max_redirects:
raise self._safe_error("redirect")
destination = urljoin(current, response.headers.get("Location", ""))
try:
self._validate_url_shape(destination)
except ValueError as error:
raise self._safe_error("redirect") from error
# The next iteration binds validators to the exact destination URL.
current = destination
continue
if response.status_code == 304:
cached = self._cache.get(self._source_id(provenance))
binding = self._validators.get(provenance)
if (
cached is None
or not headers
or binding is None
or binding[0] != current
):
raise self._safe_error("conditional_response")
self._cache.move_to_end(cached.source.source_id)
return cached
if not 200 <= response.status_code <= 299:
raise EvidenceSourceError(
"HTTP status failure",
category=self._status_category(response.status_code),
details={"operation": "download", "status": response.status_code},
)
length = response.headers.get("Content-Length")
if length is not None and int(length) > self.max_bytes:
raise self._safe_error("download", limit_bytes=self.max_bytes)
content = bytearray()
for chunk in response.iter_content(
chunk_size=min(64 * 1024, self.max_bytes + 1)
):
content.extend(chunk)
if len(content) > self.max_bytes:
raise self._safe_error("download", limit_bytes=self.max_bytes)
etag = response.headers.get("ETag")
last_modified = response.headers.get("Last-Modified")
media_type = (
response.headers.get("Content-Type", "").split(";", 1)[0] or None
)
break
finally:
if response is not None:
response.close()
except EvidenceSourceError:
raise
except (requests.Timeout, requests.ConnectionError, TimeoutError) as error:
raise self._safe_error("download", transient=True) from error
except requests.RequestException as error:
raise self._safe_error("download", transient=True) from error
except (OSError, ValueError) as error:
raise self._safe_error("download") from error
modified_at = None
if etag:
fingerprint = f"etag:{hashlib.sha256(etag.encode()).hexdigest()}"
elif last_modified:
try:
modified_at = parsedate_to_datetime(last_modified).astimezone(UTC)
fingerprint = f"last-modified:{int(modified_at.timestamp())}"
except (TypeError, ValueError, OverflowError):
fingerprint = f"sha256:{hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest()}"
else:
fingerprint = f"sha256:{hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest()}"
item = SourceObject(
source_id=self._source_id(provenance),
uri=provenance,
fingerprint=fingerprint,
modified_at=modified_at,
)
document = AcquiredDocument(
source=item,
content=bytes(content),
media_type=media_type,
acquired_at=datetime.now(UTC),
)
self._remember(provenance, current, document, (etag, last_modified))
return document
def discover(self):
for provenance in sorted(self._transport_by_uri):
yield self._download(self._transport_by_uri[provenance], provenance).source
def acquire(self, item: SourceObject) -> AcquiredDocument:
transport = self._transport_by_uri.get(item.uri)
if transport is None or item.source_id != self._source_id(item.uri):
raise self._safe_error("acquire")
document = self._download(transport, item.uri)
if document.source.fingerprint != item.fingerprint:
raise self._safe_error("acquire")
return document