# Runtime secrets The canonical deployment secret is the single local file `deploy/secrets/thothii.secrets`. Copy the tracked template and protect the copy: ```sh cp deploy/secrets/thothii.secrets.example deploy/secrets/thothii.secrets chmod 600 deploy/secrets/thothii.secrets ``` The file uses strict `KEY=VALUE` lines (comments and blank lines are allowed). The supported keys are `THT_MODEL_API_KEY`, `THT_DWH_API_KEY`, `THT_CA`, `THT_SSL_CA`, and `PI_PROVIDER_API_KEY`. Values must be non-empty and contain no whitespace. Do not put secrets in the root `.env`, workspace YAML, URLs, logs, or rendered Compose output. Compose mounts the bundle read-only as `/run/secrets/thothii.secrets`. The host file must be a regular non-symlink file with mode `0600` or `0400`; Docker's normal `0444` mode is accepted only for the runtime mount beneath `/run/secrets`. The core runs as UID 10001. Verify the mount without printing its contents: ```sh docker compose --env-file deploy/env/local.env \ -f compose.yaml -f deploy/compose.local.yaml \ run --rm core sh -c 'id && test -r /run/secrets/thothii.secrets' ``` A private CA PEM chain is not a bundle value: PEM whitespace is rejected by the strict parser. Keep it in the host or secret manager and add a reviewed Compose override that mounts it at `/run/secrets/ca-chain.pem` and sets `THT_SSL_CA` (or the adapter-specific setting). The base Compose files intentionally do not create this mount. ## Migration from separate secret files Older installations used `THT_*_SECRET_FILE` variables and one file per value. Migrate by copying each retained value to its bundle key, validating with the complete base+profile command, and only then deleting the old files. The old variables remain a compatibility path for staged upgrades, but the documented and tested default is an absolute `THT_SECRETS_FILE` path to the protected bundle. Hosted Pi providers must use a single provider key. Compound providers (Bedrock, Azure OpenAI Responses, Cloudflare Workers AI/Gateway) fail closed until a provider-specific credential adapter is implemented. ## User-owned session database secrets The server-session overlay deliberately does **not** add session database credentials to the shared bundle. Materialize three distinct Docker secrets from protected host or secret-manager files: `session_runtime_password`, `session_migrator_password`, and `session_ca.pem`. Their host source paths are respectively `THT_SESSION_RUNTIME_PASSWORD_SOURCE`, `THT_SESSION_MIGRATOR_PASSWORD_SOURCE`, and `THT_SESSION_CA_SOURCE`; all must be absolute paths outside the repository. The runtime password is mounted only into `core`; the migrator password is mounted only into the one-shot `session-migrate` service. Do not reuse either login for the other role. `session_ca.pem` is a PEM file rather than a bundle value because the bundle rejects whitespace. The server workspace receives only its mount path through `THT_SESSION_DB_SSLROOTCERT`; it uses `THT_SESSION_DB_SSLMODE=verify-ca` or, normally, `verify-full`. TLS disable/prefer/require modes are unsupported for session storage.