# Runtime secrets and private CA

Secret values in this directory are ignored by Git and remain local to the cloned `ThothII`
directory. This self-contained layout is the default installation documented in
`docs/installazione-docker-4-contesti.md`; an enterprise deployment may point the same
`*_SECRET_FILE` variables at an external secret-manager materialization instead.

Compose mounts each file read-only beneath `/run/secrets`. The core process runs as UID 10001;
the mounted files must be readable by that UID. Docker Compose file-backed secrets are normally
mounted read-only with mode `0444`. This mode is accepted only for runtime paths beneath
`/run/secrets`, where the container mount is read-only and scoped to services that declare the
secret. Source files on the host must have no group/other bits (`0600` or `0400`). Verify with:

```sh
docker compose -f compose.yaml -f deploy/compose.production.yaml \
  --profile external run --rm core sh -c 'id && test -r /run/secrets/thoth_ca.pem'
```

The CA file should contain only the public PEM certificate chain. API-key files should contain
one value with no surrounding quotes.

`THT_MODEL_API_KEY_SECRET_FILE` supplies one generic hosted-model key to the core. The backend
reads it afresh for each Pi child and maps it to the selected provider's native environment name;
the generic path/value is not placed in settings, health output, argv, or logs. Supported hosted
providers include Anthropic, OpenAI, Google/Gemini, DeepSeek, Z.AI, Groq, Mistral, OpenRouter,
xAI, and Cerebras. Local Ollama/LM Studio providers require no file. Compound providers such as
Bedrock, Azure OpenAI Responses, and Cloudflare Workers AI/Gateway fail closed because they
require multiple credential/configuration values. Unknown hosted providers fail closed until an
explicit mapping is added.

## Rotating the initialized local-vector bootstrap password

Replacing `THT_VECTOR_BOOTSTRAP_PASSWORD_SECRET_FILE` or changing its contents does **not** rotate
an initialized PostgreSQL cluster. Use the supported workflow against the running local-vector
project:

```sh
./scripts/vector-rotate-bootstrap-password.sh \
  deploy/secrets/vector_bootstrap_password \
  deploy/secrets/vector_bootstrap_password.next
```

The command authenticates using the current file, changes only the authenticated bootstrap role,
verifies a new login, and only then atomically replaces the current deployment secret file. If old
authentication or new-login verification fails, it exits without changing the deployment file;
verification failure also attempts to restore the old database password over the still-open
authenticated connection. After success, run the printed `vector-reconcile`/migration/core command.

`THT_VECTOR_BOOTSTRAP_USER` is authoritative for database initialization, reconciliation, and
rotation; non-default bootstrap role names are supported. Bootstrap, migrator, reader, and writer
secret files must be non-empty and contain no whitespace (including trailing newlines). Rotation
rejects invalid files before contacting PostgreSQL or staging a deployment-file replacement.

Keep the staged new file on the same trusted host, mode `0600`, and retain a secure backup until the
post-rotation reconciliation and application health checks pass.