# Task 2 report — portable Compose contract

## Status

Completed. The root Compose file is now a portable two-service base, with explicit local and
server overrides. Workspace-registry configuration remains generic and continues to require an
installation-provided Git remote.

## Changed files

- `.env.example` — shared non-secret, generic endpoint and registry examples.
- `compose.yaml` — portable `core` and `frontend` base, owned `thothii` network, health checks,
  named settings/Pi/registry/session volumes, and generic external endpoint variables.
- `deploy/compose.local.yaml` — loopback core/frontend ports, `AUTH_MODE=none`, local
  installation identity, and non-persistent restart policy.
- `deploy/compose.server.yaml` — frontend-only configurable host bind, `AUTH_MODE=upstream`,
  server identity, host-root data/Pi/registry mounts, and restart policy.
- `deploy/env/local.env.example` and `deploy/env/server.env.example` — safe profile-specific
  values using `.example.invalid` documentation domains.
- `scripts/test-default-compose.sh` — default local portable Compose assertion.
- `scripts/test-unified-compose.sh` — JSON structural assertions for base/local/server plus the
  required missing-remote failure checks.

## RED evidence

Before changing Compose, `bash scripts/test-unified-compose.sh` exited 1 with:

```text
Error: forbidden application coupling
```

The failure was raised by the required assertion while the rendered root config still contained
the portal-specific networks and host paths.

## GREEN evidence

The following fresh commands completed with exit status 0:

```text
bash scripts/test-default-compose.sh
# default Compose contract passed.

bash scripts/test-unified-compose.sh
# unified Compose contract passed.

bash -lc 'set -a; source deploy/env/local.env.example; set +a; docker compose -f compose.yaml -f deploy/compose.local.yaml config --quiet'

bash -lc 'set -a; source deploy/env/server.env.example; set +a; docker compose -f compose.yaml -f deploy/compose.server.yaml config --quiet'

bash scripts/verify-line-endings.sh
git diff --check
```

The two `config --quiet` invocations source only their non-secret profile example so the requested
commands can validate the required Git-remote interpolation without an operator `.env` file.

## Self-review

- The base renders exactly `core` and `frontend`; it has no portal, Chirone, local-LLM-network, or
  host-path coupling.
- Local publishing is loopback-only; server has no core host port and publishes the frontend bind.
- The core retains outbound access for configured external DWH, vector, Git, embedding, and LLM
  endpoints; the owned Compose network is private to this stack but is not marked Docker-internal.
- The structural test validates the exact required service assertion, forbidden-coupling assertion,
  required base network/volumes, profile port policy, and `THT_WORKSPACE_GIT_REMOTE` failure.
- All new YAML and shell files were checked by the repository line-ending verifier.

## Commit

`2595d35682a5200b877acb71764b4eb195a39ea4` — `deploy: unify local and server compose stack`

## Concerns

None for Task 2. Git and connector secret transport remains intentionally outside this base/profile
contract and is addressed by the next scoped task.

---

## Fix round 1/5 — Pi auth mount and generic LLM endpoint

### Status

Completed. Pi’s mutable state remains writable, while provider authentication is supplied only by
the deterministic `PI_AUTH_FILE` host-file contract mounted read-only at Pi’s canonical
`/home/thoth/.pi/agent/auth.json` path. The base now exposes the generic `THT_LLM_URL` contract;
the local and server examples set only documentation endpoint values.

### Changed files

- `compose.yaml` — adds `THT_LLM_URL` and a read-only `PI_AUTH_FILE` bind while retaining the
  writable `pi-state` volume for non-secret runtime state.
- `deploy/compose.server.yaml` — retains the auth-file bind when its storage mounts override the
  portable base.
- `.env.example`, `deploy/env/local.env.example`, and `deploy/env/server.env.example` — document
  the generic `https://llm.example.invalid` endpoint; profile examples also document the required
  host auth-file path without including a secret.
- `scripts/test-unified-compose.sh` — asserts generic LLM contract presence, no Docker
  socket/daemon mount, and exactly one read-only Pi auth file bind in the base and both profiles.

### RED evidence

Before the Compose changes, this command exited 1:

```text
bash scripts/test-unified-compose.sh

Error: core must expose a generic THT_LLM_URL endpoint contract
```

The failure was raised by the new structural assertion against the previous rendered base.

### GREEN evidence

The following focused commands completed with exit status 0 after the fix:

```text
bash scripts/test-unified-compose.sh
# unified Compose contract passed.

bash scripts/test-default-compose.sh
# default Compose contract passed.

docker compose --env-file deploy/env/local.env.example -f compose.yaml -f deploy/compose.local.yaml config --quiet

docker compose --env-file deploy/env/server.env.example -f compose.yaml -f deploy/compose.server.yaml config --quiet

bash scripts/verify-line-endings.sh
git diff --check
```

### Self-review

- Both rendered profile contracts carry a single `bind` mount to the Pi `auth.json` file with
  `read_only: true`; no auth value appears in Compose or the environment examples.
- The writable Pi-state mount does not replace the read-only auth file, and the server override
  explicitly retains that file bind after replacing the base storage list.
- The structural regression test rejects any Docker socket/daemon mount and validates the generic
  LLM endpoint contract without adding provider-specific endpoints or hostnames.
- The deferred Minor report-wording finding was not changed.

### Commit

`2ce2e0089a66ca508db041a71db9807f66d0bf24` — `fix: harden compose Pi auth mounts`

### Concerns

None for this focused round.