# Runtime secrets

The canonical deployment secret is the single local file
`deploy/secrets/thothii.secrets`. Copy the tracked template and protect the copy:

```sh
cp deploy/secrets/thothii.secrets.example deploy/secrets/thothii.secrets
chmod 600 deploy/secrets/thothii.secrets
```

The file uses strict `KEY=VALUE` lines (comments and blank lines are allowed). The supported
installation keys are `THT_MODEL_API_KEY`, `THT_DWH_API_KEY`, `THT_CA`, `THT_SSL_CA`,
`THT_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET`, and `THT_AUTHENTIK_API_TOKEN`. Metadata-generation models may reference
exactly one of `THT_METADATA_API_KEY`, `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY`, `AZURE_API_KEY`, `GEMINI_API_KEY`,
`DEEPSEEK_API_KEY`, `OPENAI_API_KEY`, `OPENROUTER_API_KEY`, or `ZAI_API_KEY` through their
descriptor `apiKeyEnv`. An entry for an explicitly configured endpoint that accepts unauthenticated
requests may omit `apiKeyEnv`; hosted/default endpoints must always reference a key.
OpenAI-compatible Qwen endpoints that emit reasoning in `content` can additionally set
`litellm.disableThinking: true`; the adapter sends the server's bounded chat-template flag so the
strict JSON result remains parseable.
The two authentication keys must be omitted until they have non-empty values in a protected OIDC
installation. Other configured values must be non-empty and contain no
whitespace. Do not put secrets in the root `.env`, installation YAML, workspace YAML, URLs, logs,
or rendered Compose output.

`THT_MODEL_API_KEY` remains the generic Pi child credential. Metadata generation is a separate
backend-owned runtime and reads only the key named by its own `metadataGeneration.models[].apiKeyEnv`
(when present);
it does not read Pi settings, `PI_AUTH_FILE`, or workspace `llm_policy`.

Do not add vector or embedding endpoint credentials to the bundle. Active operator manuals use
internal Qdrant and Ollama services, so vector/embedding runtime endpoint secrets are not part of
the supported installation contract.

Compose mounts the bundle read-only as `/run/secrets/thothii.secrets`. The host file must be a
regular non-symlink file with mode `0600` or `0400`; Docker's normal `0444` mode is accepted
only for the runtime mount beneath `/run/secrets`. The core runs as UID 10001. Verify the mount
without printing its contents:

```sh
docker compose --env-file deploy/env/local.env \
  -f compose.yaml -f deploy/compose.local.yaml \
  run --rm core sh -c 'id && test -r /run/secrets/thothii.secrets'
```

A private CA PEM chain is not a bundle value: PEM whitespace is rejected by the strict parser.
Keep it in the host or secret manager and add a reviewed Compose override that mounts it at
`/run/secrets/ca-chain.pem` and sets `THT_SSL_CA` (or the adapter-specific setting). The base
Compose files intentionally do not create this mount.

## Migration from separate secret files

Older installations used `THT_*_SECRET_FILE` variables and one file per value. Migrate by
copying each retained value to its bundle key, validating with the complete base+profile command,
and only then deleting the old files. The old variables remain a compatibility path for staged
upgrades, but the documented and tested default is an absolute `THT_SECRETS_FILE` path to the
protected bundle.

Hosted Pi providers must use a single model key through `THT_MODEL_API_KEY`. Compound providers
(Bedrock, Azure OpenAI Responses, Cloudflare Workers AI/Gateway) fail closed until a
provider-specific credential adapter is implemented.

## User-owned session database secrets

The server-session overlay deliberately does **not** add session database credentials to the
shared bundle. Materialize three distinct Docker secrets from protected host or secret-manager
files: `session_runtime_password`, `session_migrator_password`, and `session_ca.pem`. Their host
source paths are respectively `THT_SESSION_RUNTIME_PASSWORD_SOURCE`,
`THT_SESSION_MIGRATOR_PASSWORD_SOURCE`, and `THT_SESSION_CA_SOURCE`; all must be absolute paths
outside the repository. The runtime password is mounted only into `core`; the migrator password
is mounted only into the one-shot `session-migrate` service. Do not reuse either login for the
other role.

`session_ca.pem` is a PEM file rather than a bundle value because the bundle rejects whitespace.
The server workspace receives only its mount path through `THT_SESSION_DB_SSLROOTCERT`; it uses
`THT_SESSION_DB_SSLMODE=verify-ca` or, normally, `verify-full`. TLS disable/prefer/require modes
are unsupported for session storage.