fix: close server bypass edge cases

This commit is contained in:
2026-08-05 12:09:32 +02:00
parent a94affd6ac
commit fc349e634c
9 changed files with 296 additions and 148 deletions
+14 -5
View File
@@ -7,12 +7,15 @@ image='golang:1.26.5-bookworm@sha256:1ecb7edf62a0408027bd5729dfd6b1b8766e578e8df
docker run --rm --volume "$root:/repository:ro" "$image" /bin/bash -ceu '
groupadd --gid 10001 thothii
useradd --uid 10001 --gid 10001 --no-create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin thothii
useradd --uid 10001 --gid 10001 --home-dir /srv/thothii --create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin thothii
# Reproduce the conservative home mode permitted by the documented useradd sequence.
chmod 0700 /srv/thothii
groupadd --gid 20001 operator-primary
groupadd --gid 20002 thothii-ops
groupadd --gid 20003 docker
useradd --uid 20001 --gid 20001 --groups 20002,20003 --create-home --shell /bin/bash operator
install -d -o 10001 -g 20002 -m 2750 /srv/thothii
install -d -o 10001 -g 20002 -m 2750 /srv/thothii/source
install -d -o 10001 -g 20002 -m 2770 /srv/thothii/operator
install -d -o 10001 -g 20002 -m 2750 /srv/thothii/secrets
@@ -52,8 +55,10 @@ sed -i "s#replace-me#/srv/thothii/source/ThothII#" /srv/thothii/operator/thothii
--output /srv/thothii/operator/connector-secrets.server.yaml
test -r /srv/thothii/secrets/dwh-password
if (printf tamper >> /srv/thothii/secrets/dwh-password) 2>/dev/null; then exit 41; fi
if touch /srv/thothii/source/operator-must-not-write 2>/dev/null; then exit 42; fi
if touch /srv/thothii/data/operator-must-not-write 2>/dev/null; then exit 43; fi
for protected in /srv/thothii /srv/thothii/source /srv/thothii/secrets \
/srv/thothii/data /srv/thothii/pi-state /srv/thothii/workspace-registry; do
if touch "$protected/operator-must-not-write" 2>/dev/null; then exit 42; fi
done
THT_THOTHCTL_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY=/srv/thothii/operator/build-output \
/srv/thothii/source/ThothII/scripts/build-thothctl.sh
if THT_THOTHCTL_OUTPUT_DIRECTORY=relative-output \
@@ -70,11 +75,15 @@ rm -f "$root_output_error"
test "$(stat -c %u:%g /srv/thothii/operator/connector-secrets.server.yaml)" = 20001:20002
test "$(stat -c %a /srv/thothii/operator/connector-secrets.server.yaml)" = 660
test "$(stat -c %u:%g /srv/thothii)" = 10001:20002
test "$(stat -c %a /srv/thothii)" = 2750
test "$(stat -c %u:%g /srv/thothii/operator/build-output/thothctl-linux-amd64)" = 20001:20002
test "$(stat -c %a /srv/thothii/operator/build-output/thothctl-linux-amd64)" = 750
test -f /srv/thothii/operator/start.marker
test ! -e /srv/thothii/source/operator-must-not-write
test ! -e /srv/thothii/data/operator-must-not-write
for protected in /srv/thothii /srv/thothii/source /srv/thothii/secrets \
/srv/thothii/data /srv/thothii/pi-state /srv/thothii/workspace-registry; do
test ! -e "$protected/operator-must-not-write"
done
test "$(cat /srv/thothii/secrets/dwh-password)" = operator-readable-secret
'
+36 -1
View File
@@ -36,6 +36,10 @@ for fixture in \
done
server_guide="$root/docs/install/server.md"
grep -Eq '^sudo install -d -o 10001 -g thothii-ops -m 2750 /srv/thothii$' "$server_guide" || {
echo "server operations guide does not set the parent traversal boundary" >&2
exit 1
}
for required in \
'thothii-ops' \
'THT_BACKUP_ROOT=/srv/thothii-backups' \
@@ -101,7 +105,8 @@ sed '/^case "\$mode" in/,$d' "$root/scripts/verify-workspace-install-docs.sh" >"
source "$verifier_functions"
adapted_reorder="$negative_root/caddy-adapted-reorder.json"
node - "$adapted_reorder" <<'NODE'
adapted_bypass="$negative_root/caddy-adapted-bypass.json"
node - "$adapted_reorder" "$adapted_bypass" <<'NODE'
const fs = require("fs");
const publicHeaders = [
"X-Thoth-Principal-Issuer", "X-Thoth-Principal-Subject",
@@ -123,6 +128,12 @@ const document = {routes: [{handle: [
{handler: "reverse_proxy", upstreams: [{dial: "127.0.0.1:8080"}]},
]}]};
fs.writeFileSync(process.argv[2], JSON.stringify(document));
const frontend = {handler: "reverse_proxy", upstreams: [{dial: "127.0.0.1:8080"}]};
const validChain = [...publicHeaders, ...trustedHeaders].map(clear).concat(auth, frontend);
fs.writeFileSync(process.argv[3], JSON.stringify({routes: [
{handle: validChain},
{handle: [frontend]},
]}));
NODE
adapted_output="$negative_root/caddy-adapted-output"
set +e
@@ -135,6 +146,16 @@ if [[ $adapted_status -eq 0 ]] || ! grep -Fq "Caddy adapted identity clears must
exit 1
fi
set +e
verify_caddy_adapted_identity_order "$adapted_bypass" >"$adapted_output" 2>&1
adapted_status=$?
set -e
if [[ $adapted_status -eq 0 ]] || ! grep -Fq "Caddy adapted frontend path bypasses complete authentication contract" "$adapted_output"; then
echo "Caddy additional direct frontend route fixture was not rejected correctly" >&2
cat "$adapted_output" >&2
exit 1
fi
negative_failures=0
expect_guide_rejected() {
local label="$1" validator="$2" source_guide="$3" relative_path="$4"
@@ -180,6 +201,9 @@ switch (mutation) {
case "server-host-loopback":
changed += "\nFor host-gateway, keep the external service listening on 127.0.0.1.\n";
break;
case "server-parent-traversal":
changed = original.replace("sudo install -d -o 10001 -g thothii-ops -m 2750 /srv/thothii\n", "");
break;
case "server-raw-remove":
changed += "\n```sh\ndocker rm thothii-core thothii-frontend\n```\n";
break;
@@ -218,6 +242,9 @@ switch (mutation) {
changed = changed.slice(0, frontendAt) + clear + "\n" + clear + changed.slice(frontendAt + clear.length);
break;
}
case "nginx-additional-bypass":
changed = original.replace(" location / {", " location /bypass {\n proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8080;\n }\n\n location / {");
break;
case "caddy-no-auth":
changed = original.replace("forward_auth auth-gateway:4180 {", "# forward authentication omitted");
break;
@@ -333,6 +360,10 @@ expect_guide_rejected \
"server host-gateway loopback listener" verify_server_guide \
"$root/docs/install/server.md" docs/install/server.md server-host-loopback \
"server host-gateway guidance assumes a host loopback listener"
expect_guide_rejected \
"server parent traversal boundary" verify_server_guide \
"$root/docs/install/server.md" docs/install/server.md server-parent-traversal \
"server installation guide does not set parent traversal boundary"
expect_guide_rejected \
"server raw container removal" verify_server_guide \
"$root/docs/install/server.md" docs/install/server.md server-raw-remove \
@@ -377,6 +408,10 @@ expect_guide_rejected \
"Nginx admin clear moved out of auth scope" verify_reverse_proxy_nginx_guide \
"$root/docs/install/reverse-proxy-nginx.md" docs/install/reverse-proxy-nginx.md nginx-admin-clear-wrong-scope \
"Nginx auth location does not clear inbound admin identity"
expect_guide_rejected \
"Nginx additional frontend bypass location" verify_reverse_proxy_nginx_guide \
"$root/docs/install/reverse-proxy-nginx.md" docs/install/reverse-proxy-nginx.md nginx-additional-bypass \
"Nginx frontend upstream location bypasses complete authentication contract"
expect_guide_rejected \
"Caddy identity without authentication" verify_reverse_proxy_caddy_guide \
"$root/docs/install/reverse-proxy-caddy.md" docs/install/reverse-proxy-caddy.md caddy-no-auth \
+120 -63
View File
@@ -547,6 +547,10 @@ verify_server_guide() {
"docker compose down --volumes" \
"reverse-proxy-nginx.md" \
"reverse-proxy-caddy.md"
if ! grep -Eq '^sudo install -d -o 10001 -g thothii-ops -m 2750 /srv/thothii$' "$guide"; then
echo "server installation guide does not set parent traversal boundary" >&2
return 1
fi
node - "$guide" <<'NODE'
const fs = require("fs");
const source = fs.readFileSync(process.argv[2], "utf8");
@@ -658,19 +662,49 @@ const identities = [
["admin", "Is-Admin", "thoth_is_admin", "x_thoth_is_admin"],
];
function escaped(value) { return value.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, "\\$&"); }
function directiveBlock(text, marker) {
const start = text.indexOf(marker);
if (start < 0) throw new Error(`Nginx proxy lacks scoped block: ${marker}`);
const opening = text.indexOf("{", start);
let depth = 0;
for (let index = opening; index < text.length; index++) {
if (text[index] === "{") depth++;
if (text[index] === "}" && --depth === 0) return text.slice(opening + 1, index);
function nginxLocations(text) {
const locations = [];
const pattern = /\blocation\s+([^\n{]+)\{/g;
for (const match of text.matchAll(pattern)) {
const opening = match.index + match[0].lastIndexOf("{");
let depth = 0;
let closing = -1;
for (let index = opening; index < text.length; index++) {
if (text[index] === "{") depth++;
if (text[index] === "}" && --depth === 0) {
closing = index;
break;
}
}
if (closing < 0) throw new Error(`Nginx proxy has unterminated location: ${match[1].trim()}`);
locations.push({selector: match[1].trim(), body: text.slice(opening + 1, closing)});
}
return locations;
}
const locations = nginxLocations(block);
const authLocations = locations.filter((location) => location.selector === "= /_authenticate");
if (authLocations.length !== 1) {
throw new Error("Nginx proxy must define exactly one authentication location");
}
const authLocation = authLocations[0].body;
const frontendLocations = locations.filter((location) =>
/proxy_pass\s+http:\/\/127\.0\.0\.1:8080\s*;/.test(location.body));
if (frontendLocations.length === 0) {
throw new Error("Nginx proxy lacks a frontend upstream location");
}
for (const location of locations) {
const upstreams = [...location.body.matchAll(/proxy_pass\s+([^;]+);/g)].map((match) => match[1].trim());
for (const upstream of upstreams) {
if (location.selector === "= /_authenticate" && upstream === "http://auth-gateway:4180/verify") continue;
if (upstream === "http://127.0.0.1:8080") continue;
throw new Error(`Nginx location proxies to an unreviewed upstream: ${upstream}`);
}
}
for (const frontendLocation of frontendLocations) {
if (!/auth_request\s+\/_authenticate\s*;/.test(frontendLocation.body)) {
throw new Error("Nginx frontend upstream location bypasses complete authentication contract");
}
throw new Error(`Nginx proxy has unterminated scoped block: ${marker}`);
}
const authLocation = directiveBlock(block, "location = /_authenticate {");
const frontendLocation = directiveBlock(block, "location / {");
for (const [label, publicName, variable, upstream] of identities) {
const trustedName = publicName === "Is-Admin" ? "Is-Admin" : publicName;
const publicClear = new RegExp(`proxy_set_header\\s+X-Thoth-${escaped(publicName)}\\s+"";`);
@@ -684,18 +718,20 @@ for (const [label, publicName, variable, upstream] of identities) {
if (authTrustedAt < 0) {
throw new Error(`Nginx auth location does not clear inbound trusted ${label} identity`);
}
const frontendPublicAt = frontendLocation.search(publicClear);
if (frontendPublicAt < 0) {
throw new Error(`Nginx frontend location does not clear inbound ${label} identity`);
}
const normalizedFrontend = frontendLocation.replace(/\s+/g, " ");
const captureAt = normalizedFrontend.search(new RegExp(`auth_request_set\\s+\\$${variable}\\s+\\$upstream_http_${upstream};`));
if (captureAt < 0) {
throw new Error(`Nginx frontend location does not capture authenticated ${label} identity`);
}
const mapAt = normalizedFrontend.search(new RegExp(`proxy_set_header\\s+${escaped(trustedHeader)}\\s+\\$${variable};`));
if (mapAt < 0) {
throw new Error(`Nginx frontend location does not map authenticated ${label} identity`);
for (const frontendLocation of frontendLocations) {
const frontendPublicAt = frontendLocation.body.search(publicClear);
if (frontendPublicAt < 0) {
throw new Error(`Nginx frontend location does not clear inbound ${label} identity`);
}
const normalizedFrontend = frontendLocation.body.replace(/\s+/g, " ");
const captureAt = normalizedFrontend.search(new RegExp(`auth_request_set\\s+\\$${variable}\\s+\\$upstream_http_${upstream};`));
if (captureAt < 0) {
throw new Error(`Nginx frontend location does not capture authenticated ${label} identity`);
}
const mapAt = normalizedFrontend.search(new RegExp(`proxy_set_header\\s+${escaped(trustedHeader)}\\s+\\$${variable};`));
if (mapAt < 0) {
throw new Error(`Nginx frontend location does not map authenticated ${label} identity`);
}
}
if (new RegExp(`auth_request_set\\s+\\$${variable}|proxy_set_header\\s+${escaped(trustedHeader)}\\s+\\$${variable};`).test(authLocation)) {
throw new Error(`Nginx auth location performs a forbidden ${label} capture or mapping`);
@@ -801,22 +837,6 @@ function frontendUpstream(handler) {
return handler?.handler === "reverse_proxy" &&
(handler.upstreams || []).some((upstream) => upstream.dial === "127.0.0.1:8080");
}
function findHandlerArray(value) {
if (!value || typeof value !== "object") return null;
if (Array.isArray(value)) {
if (value.some(authUpstream) && value.some(frontendUpstream)) return value;
for (const child of value) {
const found = findHandlerArray(child);
if (found) return found;
}
return null;
}
for (const child of Object.values(value)) {
const found = findHandlerArray(child);
if (found) return found;
}
return null;
}
function collectTrustedSets(value, collected = new Map()) {
if (!value || typeof value !== "object") return collected;
if (value.handler === "headers") {
@@ -827,36 +847,73 @@ function collectTrustedSets(value, collected = new Map()) {
for (const child of Object.values(value)) collectTrustedSets(child, collected);
return collected;
}
const handlers = findHandlerArray(document);
if (!handlers) throw new Error("Caddy adapted config lacks the ordered auth/frontend handler chain");
const authAt = handlers.findIndex(authUpstream);
const frontendAt = handlers.findIndex(frontendUpstream);
if (authAt < 0 || frontendAt <= authAt) throw new Error("Caddy adapted auth/frontend handler order is invalid");
const expectedClears = [...publicHeaders, ...trustedHeaders];
for (const header of expectedClears) {
const clearAt = handlers.findIndex((handler) =>
handler?.handler === "headers" && (handler.request?.delete || []).includes(header));
if (clearAt < 0 || clearAt >= authAt) {
throw new Error("Caddy adapted identity clears must execute before authentication");
function validateAuthenticatedMappings(auth) {
const successResponse = (auth.handle_response || []).find((response) =>
(response.match?.status_code || []).map(Number).includes(2));
if (!successResponse) throw new Error("Caddy adapted identity mapping is not restricted to auth 2xx");
const mappings = collectTrustedSets(successResponse);
for (let index = 0; index < trustedHeaders.length; index++) {
const replacement = mappings.get(trustedHeaders[index]);
const expected = `{http.reverse_proxy.header.${publicHeaders[index]}}`;
if (!Array.isArray(replacement) || replacement.length !== 1 || replacement[0] !== expected) {
throw new Error(`Caddy adapted authenticated mapping is invalid for ${trustedHeaders[index]}`);
}
}
}
const auth = handlers[authAt];
const successResponse = (auth.handle_response || []).find((response) =>
(response.match?.status_code || []).map(Number).includes(2));
if (!successResponse) throw new Error("Caddy adapted identity mapping is not restricted to auth 2xx");
const mappings = collectTrustedSets(successResponse);
for (let index = 0; index < trustedHeaders.length; index++) {
const replacement = mappings.get(trustedHeaders[index]);
const expected = `{http.reverse_proxy.header.${publicHeaders[index]}}`;
if (!Array.isArray(replacement) || replacement.length !== 1 || replacement[0] !== expected) {
throw new Error(`Caddy adapted authenticated mapping is invalid for ${trustedHeaders[index]}`);
function validateFrontendPath(handlers) {
let authAt = -1;
for (let index = handlers.length - 1; index >= 0; index--) {
if (authUpstream(handlers[index])) {
authAt = index;
break;
}
}
if (authAt < 0) {
throw new Error("Caddy adapted frontend path bypasses complete authentication contract");
}
for (const header of expectedClears) {
const clearAt = handlers.findIndex((handler) =>
handler?.handler === "headers" && (handler.request?.delete || []).includes(header));
if (clearAt < 0 || clearAt >= authAt) {
throw new Error("Caddy adapted identity clears must execute before authentication");
}
}
validateAuthenticatedMappings(handlers[authAt]);
for (let index = 0; index < handlers.length; index++) {
if (index !== authAt && collectTrustedSets(handlers[index]).size !== 0) {
throw new Error("Caddy adapted config maps trusted identity outside auth success");
}
}
}
for (let index = 0; index < handlers.length; index++) {
if (index === authAt) continue;
if (collectTrustedSets(handlers[index]).size !== 0) {
throw new Error("Caddy adapted config maps trusted identity outside auth success");
let frontendPaths = 0;
function walk(value, inherited = []) {
if (!value || typeof value !== "object") return;
if (Array.isArray(value)) {
for (const child of value) walk(child, inherited);
return;
}
if (frontendUpstream(value)) {
frontendPaths++;
validateFrontendPath(inherited);
}
if (Array.isArray(value.handle)) {
const previous = [];
for (const handler of value.handle) {
walk(handler, [...inherited, ...previous]);
previous.push(handler);
}
for (const [key, child] of Object.entries(value)) {
if (key !== "handle") walk(child, inherited);
}
return;
}
const childContext = authUpstream(value) ? [...inherited, value] : inherited;
for (const child of Object.values(value)) walk(child, childContext);
}
walk(document);
if (frontendPaths === 0) {
throw new Error("Caddy adapted config lacks a frontend handler path");
}
NODE
}