fix(ci): preserve secure secret mount ownership
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@@ -1018,10 +1018,11 @@ task13_prepare_local_application_secrets() {
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test -f /source/task13-runtime-password && test ! -L /source/task13-runtime-password
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test -z "$(find /target -mindepth 1 -maxdepth 1 -print -quit)"
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cp /source/thothii.secrets /source/task13-runtime-password /target/
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chown 10001:10001 /target /target/thothii.secrets /target/task13-runtime-password
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chmod 0700 /target
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chown 0:0 /target
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chown 10001:10001 /target/thothii.secrets /target/task13-runtime-password
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chmod 0755 /target
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chmod 0600 /target/thothii.secrets /target/task13-runtime-password
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test "$(stat -c "%u:%g:%a" /target)" = 10001:10001:700
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test "$(stat -c "%u:%g:%a" /target)" = 0:0:755
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test "$(stat -c "%u:%g:%a" /target/thothii.secrets)" = 10001:10001:600
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test "$(stat -c "%u:%g:%a" /target/task13-runtime-password)" = 10001:10001:600
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'
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@@ -2471,6 +2472,7 @@ task13_self_test_source_contract() {
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local auth_runtime_mount auth_root_mount auth_projection auth_runtime_owner
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local pi_auth_bind pi_projection registry_runtime_mount registry_root_mount registry_projection
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local application_secret_bind application_secret_mount application_secret_projection
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local application_secret_parent_owner application_secret_file_owner
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root="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd -P)"
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workflow="$root/.github/workflows/deployment.yml"
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host_network='--network'' host'
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@@ -2488,6 +2490,8 @@ task13_self_test_source_contract() {
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application_secret_bind='$TASK13_''SECRETS:/run/secrets/thothii.secrets:ro'
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application_secret_mount='application-secrets:/run/''secrets:ro'
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application_secret_projection='task13_prepare_local_application_''secrets'
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application_secret_parent_owner='chown 0:''0 /target'
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application_secret_file_owner='chown 10001:''10001 /target/thothii.secrets /target/task13-runtime-password'
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if rg -n 'docker[[:space:]]+(system[[:space:]]+)?prune' \
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"$root/scripts/unified-deployment-smoke.sh" \
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"$root/scripts/tht-update-smoke.sh" \
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@@ -2528,6 +2532,10 @@ task13_self_test_source_contract() {
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[[ "$(grep -Ec "^${application_secret_projection}\\(\\)|^[[:space:]]+${application_secret_projection}$" \
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"$root/scripts/unified-deployment-smoke.sh")" -eq 2 ]] \
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|| task13_fail "the local application-secret projection must be defined and invoked once"
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grep -Fq -- "$application_secret_parent_owner" "$root/scripts/unified-deployment-smoke.sh" \
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|| task13_fail "the local application-secret mount root must remain root-owned"
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grep -Fq -- "$application_secret_file_owner" "$root/scripts/unified-deployment-smoke.sh" \
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|| task13_fail "the projected application secrets must remain readable only by the core UID"
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grep -Eq '^TASK13_BAD_CANDIDATE_IMAGE="[^"[:space:]]+@sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}"$' \
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"$root/scripts/unified-deployment-smoke.sh" \
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|| task13_fail "the bad rollback candidate must be an immutable digest reference"
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